Right now, an unpredecented event is occurring in North Korea. For the time in over 30 years has the ruling workers party of Korea held a national congress, seen by many as an attempt by Kim Jong Un to consolidate his power, legitimacy and also vision for the isolated country's future. Needless to say, it is a shift in orthodoxy, his father and predecessor Kim Jong Il never bothering with such and instead consolidating power through military command with his famed "Songun" politics. The congress demonstrates that Kim the younger, whose days are seemingly not numbered like his aged father's were, has a lot more to think about if he is to hold onto power and the regime until his natural death. Given the international predicament North Korea still faces, Kim Jong Un hasn't just got to worry about the survival of his system, but likewise the need to transform it into something that the North Korean people can find prestigious again, bypassing the ill ridden days of famine, economic collapse and destitution. The path of reform, must be walked... whether he likes or not.
One of the most obvious distinctions about the North Korean political system in comparison to other countries is its stubborn resistance to change, openess and reform, even in the onset of total crisis. Stemming directly from the deep lasting insecurities that historical experiences have brought upon it. Thus remarkably, the original economic, political and social order that Kim Il-Sung built in the 1950s stood still for decades and even when it began to fall apart there was little change of course. As the 1980s "neo-liberal opening" occurred throughout the world, even in China, North Korea stood rooted still. Thus, the result was that after the Soviet era came to an abrupt end in the early 1990s the North Korean economy completely collapsed. Factories ceased to operate, trade evaporated, fertilizer ran out and then a series of floods destroyed the agricultural system bringing about a famine which oversaw the deaths of millions of people. Yet, the regime saw it as preferential to let its people perish than to risk change at a time when similar regimes all over the world were collapsing. Reform to the hostile, dangerous and ideologically polluted world was unsafe, dangerous, even political suicide at best...
Nonetheless, the new dire economic circumstances that the country found itself in the post 1990s ultimately ensured that the question of reform could not be ignored. The countries economic system, no longer functioned and that came with irreversible side effects. Underneath the wreckage of the broken Stalinist model command economy rose a series of unofficial markets whereby citizens traded goods and commodities amongst themselves to survive. No longer could the average North Korean rely on the state and its "public distribution system" rationings and hope to be prosperous. Thus naturally, market influences penetrated the country and a steady stream of goods and food trickled in implicit;y across the Chinese border. The elites likewise began to use their connections, positions, ministries and resources to take advantage of this "unofficial" system and quickly got wealthier; an entire economy, discrete from the official economy itself, emerged in North Korea.
Kim Jong Il, insecure at the new unipolar world led by the United States, was not enthusiastic about the changes which had occurred; he would never encourage them, but he would have to tolerate and regulate them, eager to retract them when he got the political capital to do so. In the early 2000s Kim the 2nd initiated regulations and rules concerning the markets which emerged throughout the country, saw the implementation of several "special economic areas" in cities around the country's borders and even engaged with South Korea in the opening of the Kaesong industrial complex. Even as he did these things, he cautiously avoided the use of the word "reform" and instead sought very conservative rhetoric such as "special" or "temporary measures". He never once intended to hurt, disown, interfere or compromise the ideological and political hold of the system.
But, by the mid 2000s, the U.S had became hostile to North Korea again as the international security environment rank and George W. Bush had proceeded on his highly controversial "war on terror", which involved the NATO invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraq War, both events which were perceived as highly threatening to North Korea's future. Kim Jong Il jumped on this insecurity as an attempt to crush movements for political reform in his country and launch a widespread attack on the markets, attempting to restore the "old system" of complete public distribution. A crackdown began, as well as a currency reform designed to destroy the markets for good. Most remarkably, he failed to succeed, with actions provoking rare discontent and even protests in areas of the country. Kim was never able to kill off the markets, because even North Koreans have limits. Nonetheless, as an aging man with failing health he knew he would be able to consolidate power with brutal oppression until his death, not having to worry about a long term vision or necessity for reform. He was right, he died in 2011 and his then 29 year old son Kim Jong Un became his designated successor.
Kim the younger however, was not in such an easy position. Perceived as young and inexperienced, he resultantly failed to command the respect of many of his officials in a culture where age was a very important element of authority. Not only that, but he did have to worry for the long term. He inherited a backward and impoverished country which most of the world had left behind, not least South Korea itself. The world, now increasingly liberal, was more hostile to North Korea's system than ever before and not only that, but the system had nothing to show for itself to the world; with people endlessly predicting its imminent collapse. Holding onto power by force would prove not enough for Kim Jong Un to legitimate his role, if he and the system was to survive it would have to find a new prestige once again. It became obvious to him that now, the question of reform could not be ignored, nor could it be even relegated to a minor priority like it was with his father.
However, old norms persisted. Just because the question of the reform was now permanent, did not mean the old North Korean cautiousness, insecurity and stubborness went away. Anything but. As always, first and foremost came the country's core political goals, security, legacy and regime survival. Thus, Kim Jong Un immediately followed his father's foosteps in pursuing a program of nuclear proliferation. This had a dual purpose, not only to defend the country from the United States, but also as a scientific, military and technological achievement which people could take pride in. For those reasons, it was worth the "short term" costs which come on the country in the form of sanctions. Thus no amount of United Nations penalties have been able to make Kim Jong Un change his mind. The strategy is simple, to develop a nuclear deterrent and force the international community to take the country seriously so Kim can then win the concessions he wants. Nuclear weapons give a country greater significance on the international stage; it is a very powerful bargaining chio. Thus, it has taken priority.
Nonetheless, in somewhat of a contradiction given the sanctions the matter above faces, Kim Jong Un has likewise still set out on a mission to economically develop North Korea and drive it forwards, a policy goal which has been unprecedented in the country's post-cold war history. He has revived the market reforms which his father attempted to scrap, he has sought to reconstruct the "special economic zones", he has initiated agricultural reforms allowing farmers to use the market and has oversaw a massive investment in slowly re-establishing the country's broken infrastructure. This has included new power stations, a modernization of the Pyongyang metro, new apartment blocks, new developments all across Pyongyang and a massive boost in the tourist infrastructure, seeking to dramatically increase the number of visitors to the country. Additionally, the regime has even sent elites out to foreign countries to study their media, their finance and business in order to change the way the country functions and presents itself.
These reforms are serious, not propaganda, simply because Kim Jong Un has no choice but to consolidate his own political survival and that of the country. Nonetheless, this is North Korea. A strong obstacle to Kim's vision is that as much as he wants to improve the country, he does not want this to come with political liberalization. He is engaging in economic reform, but not political reform. North Korea's rigid, totalitarian and absolutist system of command will stay the same; because it is the North Korean way to never concede serious political power in fear of the consequences. Kim will not, nor ever, disown the mistakes, legacies or the crimes of his forefathers. The result is a massive contradiction opens up which will certainly test the limits of North Korea's political resilience. Yet, Despite everything, the world is creeping in. The last time I went the tour guides were talking about the Champions league, Chelsea, Jose Mourinho, Louis Van Gaal and had even heard of Sunderland football club. Nor are these people ignorant, deceived or deluded concerning the country's economic situation in the world anymore. Even behind the observable scenes, the illegal trickle of South Korean content into the country has continued and Kim's desire to boost tourism has brought more North Koreans into contact with foreigners than ever.
All in all, it remains to be seen how the North Korean system is handling the question of reform, whether it can succeed or whether as so many believe, will lead the regime to capitulate. Regardless though of what we see changing, the regime's priority of security, survival and nuclear proliferation seriously limits the lengths it can go to and in that respect, Kim Jong Un is little different from his predecessors, he just has to think a bit more about his long term future and attempt to make things better for people, or in the traditional Korean sense bring shame upon the legacy of his ancestors.
