For careful observers of North Korean Affairs, the past few months has brought some unprecedented developments. There has been a wave of what can be described as "high profile" defections from the secret state, "high profile" meaning here not just starving and desperate people, who categorize your average North Korean defectors, but individuals from the upper echelons of North Korean society. These are people who are more materially privileged, get priority in resources, have more access to the outside world and are thus expected to be "more loyal" to Kim Jong Un than your typical North Korean. Yet, since March, a wave of defections has trickled from this group that hasn't been seen in decades, it begun with the escape of numerous restaurant workers in China and has been followed by an army Colonel, a top maths student at a competition in Hong Kong and to top it all, a North Korean diplomat in London. Although we should not be misled into thinking elite defections are a new thing, especially given the famous defection of Kim Jong Il's right hand man, Hwang Jang-Yop, in 1997; the consistency and momentum of these defections will be bringing alarm to Kim Jong Un. They send a clear message to him that elite groups in Pyongyang are dissatisfied with the regime and are effectively, giving up hope.
Although these things do not mean North Korea is on the verge of collapse or that Kim Jong Un will be deposed, what it does mean is that some form of change is inevitable. The outside world is creeping in, North Koreans are increasingly aware and increasingly conscious of the world around them and their country's position in it, the propaganda is not working and North Koreans are not, as stereotyped, droid like zombies, ignorant of their situation. If those in the elite have now had enough, then there are serious problems. For the past four years, Kim Jong Un has sought to consolidate his power through brutal force and lethal fearpolitik, but he has never been blind to the fact that force has its limits and, much to his worst fears, that his ultimate political survival rests upon his willingness to initiate and experiment with reform in North Korea, a word not even contemplated for the first 50 years of the country's history. North Korea now sits at a crossroads, it can either pursue economic development and slowly open itself into a Chinese style system, or it can remain how it is and continue to deteriorate, the cracks only being patched and glued together by the system's brutality. Thus, these defections have some big implications, let's explore them and let's map out the path ahead.
The cracking of the "Songbun" system
What these new defections firstly demonstrate is that the existing North Korean policy of social hierarchy, division and priority, commonly known as "Songbun" is no longer helping to hold the regime together the way it once was. Despite North Korea's claim to be a socialist state, what we call "Songbun" stands in direct contradiction to it. Songbun is in effect, a caste system based on traditional Korean political thought; it divides all of North Korean society into three groups, "Loyal", "Wavering" and "Hostile". These groups are predetermined before your birth, they are defined by the deeds of your family for three generations, stemming from the traditional Korean and Asian idea that you inherit the legacies of your ancestors. If your grandfather was part of Kim Il-Sung's inner circle from the beginning, you are given a "Loyal" Songbun and therefore entitled to the best of what North Korea has to offer in resources, but if your grandfather worked for the Japanese in World War II or was a landowner or priest, you're "hostile" and entitled to nothing, whereas "wavering" is sort of average really. In this system, you can move down (as punishment) but you cannot move up.
These Songbun groups thus effectively map out what you are entitled to in North Korea, they effect the jobs you can have, the education you can have, how far you can rise up in society, where you can live, how much food you are entitled to, everything. Those in the "Hostile" category are not permitted to live in Pyongyang, they are banished to the outer villages and cities and are the first to be abandoned by the regime in the times of famine. Whereas, only those who are of a "Loyal" Songbun may enter the Worker's Party of Korea, have contact with the outside world and work in the most elite posts. This system was created in the 1950s and was carefully designed to relegate those who were of potential opposition whilst to create excessive privilege for those who were loyal to gain their lasting political support. North Korea is not an equal society, those at the top are economically empowered to maintain their devotion, whilst those in the bottom are too weak and disempowered to do anything about their situation. When food aid is given to North Korea, it goes to the loyal group first, the great famine of the 1990s didn't happen in Pyongyang, it only happened in areas full of "hostile" people who were effectively left to die, with all the aid diverted to the prioritised groups.
Therefore, when people in the "Loyal" category of Songbun start abandoning North Korea and denouncing the regime, you know something isn't working. The entire songbun system was created to prevent that, those at the top are not in need. Unlike the hostile categories, they are not starving, they are not desperate and they are not clueless of the outside world, although this excessive knowledge of the outside world may itself be a contributing factor. Yet they have had enough, the decades old tactic of giving more loyal groups the lion's share of resources to maintain obedience is failing; the regime must now start looking for other ways to gain public support, because endless propaganda, division and oppression have their limits, the path to reform must be opened up.
Reform- is it possible?
North Korea should follow such an experimental model and rather than rely on ideology and propaganda, they should rely on economic growth as a new means of sustaining support, it will end the famine and defections. But of only of course, if only it was that easy... another enormous obstacle to reform lies in the form of North Korea's nuclear program and Kim's intent to make the country a nuclear power. North Korea's economic performance is firstly hindered by enormous sanctions over nuclear tests, secondly by almost universal diplomatic disapproval and thirdly by the fact most resources go towards building and maintaining these weapons, than developing the ecomomy. The Kim dynasty has pursued these weapons to deter American invasion (which has been a serious fear in the past 25 years) and also to build internal prestige as a form of "national achievement" which clearly isn't working. Without them, the regime feels threatened and believes the world will not take their diplomacy seriously, it certainly puts them on the stage of global attention.
Kim Jong Un's biggest problem is that he wants economic reform, but he also wants this too, pinning his flag to the mast of a double policy of dual "nuclear development and economic reform" known as byungjin. The problem is you can't have both, one contradicts the other. However, going back to the topic of "elite defections", this cycle of defections begun after the consequences of the nuclear test in January and the harsh sanctions that followed. Although it cannot be confirmed, it would seem there is a link between the pattern of events. Kim has made promises of nuclear development to the North Korean people, openly, the fact that he's actually pledged something makes him more accountable and open to (at least secret) criticism that his predecessors... so he cannot turn back to save face, but he would be wise to take it no further. After all, North Korea has some nuclear weapons, enough to make their enemies think twice about starting a conflict, why take it further? why develop more? A shrewd politician would pretend that the nuclear development has been achieved, cease further testing, gain some diplomatic and sanction concessions having done that, (although not abolish it entirely) and then work on the economic side as a priority.
The North Koreans after all, don't want nukes, they want better lives. The regime may fear a foreign invasion and given all the countries the U.S has attacked or attempted to overthrow, that is understandable, but in the people's minds, their survival and life comes first (as does everyone's), no amount of propaganda is going to hypnotise them into changing their priorities or disregarding their interests because that is not how human nature works. Hence why so many North Koreans would rather choose to live in South Korea than to keep up the concert and suffer for a struggle they don't really believe in. These elite defections are therefore a turning point, it would be to the benefit of all if North Korea decided to focus on economic reform and pursue a more limited openness; nobody anticipates them to become a "liberal democracy", but like China, the world can live with, accept and work with a North Korea in a Chinese or Vietnamese style system. If its own elite can no longer tolerate the status quo, then that difficult, rocky road to reform has to be walked. I suspect Kim Jong Un will try to do this, what choice does he have? He could be damned if he does and certainly damned (at least in the long run) if he doesn't.
North Korea is a system which by and large, resists change. Although changes have occurred in the country over the past 60 years, most of these were natural, informal, unavoidable and not directly brought about by the regime. Whilst countries like China and Vietnam have re-innovated themselves, opened up to the world, liberalised their economies and experienced rapid growth, North Korea has been left behind in a semi-static state, choosing to endure total economic devastation and famine than compromise its ideological integrity. Its resistance to change is rooted in its insecurity and a fear of collapse.
On this matter of resistance to change, it is important to note that North Korea does not have the prestige of being a single nation state with a unique, grand history, which its people can look to for pride, like China has. Rather, North Korea competes (well it did once) with a far wealthier, far more successful, far more popular and far more advanced state which claims the same national identity and heritage. North Korea does not monopolise the notion of what we know as "Korea" and therefore this becomes a massive weakness. When a North Korean defects to South Korea, they have not abandoned the "Korean Nation" or "Korean identity", they have abandoned the state and system of "North Korea" and are capable of taking pride outside of it. This makes the North Korean system just that bit more vulnerable and the defections prove it- after all, if you live in North Korea, what have you got to be proud of in contrast to the South? Apart from "nuclear bombs", nothing else.
Therefore, as Andrei Lankov, in his bestselling book "The Real North Korea" argues, North Korea do not want to reform and open up because it will maximise the influence and knowledge of the South and effectively bring a quick end to the North Korean system. It's a good argument, an instant opening up would certainly do that, although Lankov seems to miss the point that knowledge of South Korean life is already widespread there. If it were not, why would North Koreans be defecting there? How would they know? Where would their desire come from? The regime's "information blockade" has long been flawed, it is strong, but flawed. Modern North Korean black markets are filled to brim with K-pop and famous South Korean TV dramas, and you know what? Although they're not stupid enough to openly admit it, they love it. But more importantly, the truth is there and even more so amongst "Loyal" groups who are defecting. Kim Jong Un has no choice but to face the truth now, and deal with it, otherwise he has no political future in the long term. He ultimately recognises this, hence he has made some piecemeal economic efforts already, but they are not enough... and it will be the ultimate test of his character to see how far he is willing to take things.
Although as mentioned, a rapid reform would end North Korea instantly, a gradual one might be more successful. It would be a disaster for all parties involved for North Korea to swing open the doors and declare itself a liberal, open, democratic country- a quick collapse of the regime would result in internal anarchy, a refugee crisis and a lack of authority in a country with nuclear weapons... no thank you... But rather, a line upon line, precept upon precept sort of change is needed, the path China took in the 1980s and 90s. The China of the 1960s and 70s was like North Korea today, although as admitted, in a much stronger position as a country; they slowly changed the system bit by bit, they would experiment with one step of openness at a time, when it succeeded they would keep the change and move onto a new thing, when it didn't, they would retract it quickly. First came China's admittance that some of the things Mao done were counterproductive or wrong, then came a call to work with "pragmatism" above ideology and allow room for some debate, then agricultural reform, then a space for private business and so on.
North Korea should follow such an experimental model and rather than rely on ideology and propaganda, they should rely on economic growth as a new means of sustaining support, it will end the famine and defections. But of only of course, if only it was that easy... another enormous obstacle to reform lies in the form of North Korea's nuclear program and Kim's intent to make the country a nuclear power. North Korea's economic performance is firstly hindered by enormous sanctions over nuclear tests, secondly by almost universal diplomatic disapproval and thirdly by the fact most resources go towards building and maintaining these weapons, than developing the ecomomy. The Kim dynasty has pursued these weapons to deter American invasion (which has been a serious fear in the past 25 years) and also to build internal prestige as a form of "national achievement" which clearly isn't working. Without them, the regime feels threatened and believes the world will not take their diplomacy seriously, it certainly puts them on the stage of global attention.
Kim Jong Un's biggest problem is that he wants economic reform, but he also wants this too, pinning his flag to the mast of a double policy of dual "nuclear development and economic reform" known as byungjin. The problem is you can't have both, one contradicts the other. However, going back to the topic of "elite defections", this cycle of defections begun after the consequences of the nuclear test in January and the harsh sanctions that followed. Although it cannot be confirmed, it would seem there is a link between the pattern of events. Kim has made promises of nuclear development to the North Korean people, openly, the fact that he's actually pledged something makes him more accountable and open to (at least secret) criticism that his predecessors... so he cannot turn back to save face, but he would be wise to take it no further. After all, North Korea has some nuclear weapons, enough to make their enemies think twice about starting a conflict, why take it further? why develop more? A shrewd politician would pretend that the nuclear development has been achieved, cease further testing, gain some diplomatic and sanction concessions having done that, (although not abolish it entirely) and then work on the economic side as a priority.
The North Koreans after all, don't want nukes, they want better lives. The regime may fear a foreign invasion and given all the countries the U.S has attacked or attempted to overthrow, that is understandable, but in the people's minds, their survival and life comes first (as does everyone's), no amount of propaganda is going to hypnotise them into changing their priorities or disregarding their interests because that is not how human nature works. Hence why so many North Koreans would rather choose to live in South Korea than to keep up the concert and suffer for a struggle they don't really believe in. These elite defections are therefore a turning point, it would be to the benefit of all if North Korea decided to focus on economic reform and pursue a more limited openness; nobody anticipates them to become a "liberal democracy", but like China, the world can live with, accept and work with a North Korea in a Chinese or Vietnamese style system. If its own elite can no longer tolerate the status quo, then that difficult, rocky road to reform has to be walked. I suspect Kim Jong Un will try to do this, what choice does he have? He could be damned if he does and certainly damned (at least in the long run) if he doesn't.
